Background The tobacco industry has a long history of attempting to influence science in order to cast doubt on evidence showing the harms of its products and to argue against the need for regulation of those products. In the 1950s when science began to establish a causal link between smoking and cancer, the industry mobilised […]
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]]>The tobacco industry has a long history of attempting to influence science in order to cast doubt on evidence showing the harms of its products and to argue against the need for regulation of those products. In the 1950s when science began to establish a causal link between smoking and cancer, the industry mobilised to cast doubt on that evidence. In the 1980s and 1990s, when it became clear that second-hand smoke was harmful, the industry funded and created science that attempted to obscure that harm.1 More recently, the tobacco industry has funded research in to newer tobacco and nicotine products and concerns have once again been raised that the industry is manipulating science for its own benefit.
Researchers from the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath have developed a typology and model – the Science for Profit Model – to explain how and why the tobacco industry (along with other harmful industries) attempts to influence science.2 The authors conclude that strategies for influencing science are used to “purposefully-create misinformation, doubt, and ignorance”, to “obscure the harms of industry products and practices” and to “oppose regulation that could threaten corporate profits”.2
Below is an overview of this research, illustrating the ways in which the industry (and third parties used by the industry) uses science to further its aims. The following strategies and examples are drawn from the Science for Profit Model.
The tobacco industry has used various strategies to influence which research is – and isn’t – undertaken and published, in order to counteract independent scientific research which might show industry products and practices in an unfavourable light.
These strategies include funding research by third parties to deflect attention from industry harms. One example is research that looked for alternative causes of cancer (including hormones and nutrition) to distract attention from the link between smoking and cancer. This was conducted through the Tobacco Industry Research Committee from the 1950s onwards.3 Another example is research that focused on issues of “indoor air” (such as dirty air filters) to deflect attention from the harms of passive smoking, conducted through the Center for Indoor Air Research in the 1980s. Since 2017, research funded by PMI through the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW) has similarly distracted attention from industry harms, including by redirecting blame towards the public health community and the media, implying that they are responsible for a slowing in the decline of smoking rates.4
Other strategies include undertaking “risky” research secretly, so that it can be hidden or abandoned if results harm the industry’s interests,2 and manipulating study design or statistical analyses to ensure favourable findings. Another is to ‘cherry-pick’ (select the most favourable) papers to include in literature reviews to obscure parts of the evidence base.2
To see how study design affected PMI-funded science on plain packaging of cigarettes visit the Ashok Kaul and Michael Wolf pages.
In order to influence what research is published, the industry has created its own journals, such as the “Tobacco and Health” research journal which was distributed to health professionals.52 More recently, it has published in journals with editorial staff who have links to the industry, and used ‘pre-print’ platforms to self-publish its own non-peer-reviewed science.46
The industry also works to distort how science and scientists are seen by the public and experts.
In the 1990s, tobacco companies launched the “Sound Science” and “Good Epidemiology” public relations campaigns. These demanded unrealistic levels of evidence in epidemiological studies examining harms caused by industry products, and were designed to prevent policy action on passive smoking.2
For decades, the industry has attacked and misrepresented science and scientists that may harm its commercial agenda. For example, in the 1990s, it criticised a US Environmental Protection Agency risk assessment which concluded that second-hand smoke was carcinogenic.2 Nearly thirty years later the director of the Centre for Research Excellence: Indigenous Sovereignty and Smoking (COREISS), an FSFW grantee, used a similar argument, despite overwhelming evidence that second-hand smoke is a health risk:
“scientific studies have not proven that exposure to cigarette smoke in the car causes disease”.47
In the 1990’s Philip Morris developed plans for what it called “Project Sunrise” – a project in which the company proposed the monitoring of individuals and organisations working in tobacco control, framing some as “extreme” and others as “moderate” in order to divide the community.8 Some of the many attacks on individuals working in tobacco control are documented on Martin Cullip, FOI: Stirling University and FOI: University of Bath.
The industry disseminates messages that support its scientific stance. A common approach is to contract third party “friendly” voices to amplify scientific messages and distance these messages from industry. These messengers include front groups, designed to look like unbiased sources, organisations such as think tanks and professional associations, and “expert” individuals.2
In the 1980s, the ‘Whitecoat Project’ was Philip Morris’s secret plan to recruit ostensibly independent scientists to disseminate scientific narratives which would help it to “restore the social acceptability of smoking”.2 Read more about the project on the Influencing Science: The Whitecoat Project page.
Organisations funded by FSFW have promoted industry-friendly scientific narratives on e-cigarettes and COVID-19, and endorsed science calling for weaker regulation of the industry’s products.4
In order to maximise press coverage of industry-favourable scientific messaging, the industry funds media outlets to disseminate its science, cite its staff, and report on its scientific events, including conferences.910 One example is Filter magazine – to find out more visit the page on The Influence Foundation.
Tobacco companies have worked to embed their own standards of evidence in policymaking, and bring about policy reforms that increase reliance on the tobacco industry’s own science.2
In the 1990s, the tobacco industry attempted to shape risk assessment of its own products, and influence European Union (EU) regulatory mechanisms in relation to the assessment of data from epidemiological and animal studies, for example. Although they did not succeed, this would have meant that the criteria used for determining scientific ‘proof’ would have been drawn up by industry itself.2
British American Tobacco promoted regulatory reform in the EU, to make it harder to implement public health policies which conflicted with its commercial interests. This ‘Better Regulation’ or ‘Smart Regulation’ appeared to be about good governance and transparency but “in fact mandated industry’s right to be heard early in scientific debates about their products and practices.”2 Read more on this topic on the EU Better Regulation page.
The industry has worked to promote its involvement in science in order to manufacture an image of scientific credibility. Many academic institutions and journals no longer collaborate with the industry directly, due to its history of scientific deception, and so the industry uses third party organisations to push for ‘renormalisation’ of its business.1112 For instance, since it was set up in 2017, FSFW has worked to frame the industry’s involvement in science and policy as the ‘solution’ and its exclusion as counterproductive, despite industry having created the problem.4
At other times the industry does not disclose its involvement in science when it believes this will lend the science more credibility. Sometimes it creates third party organisations that appear to be independent, to conduct its research (e.g. Philip Morris setting up the Institute for Biological Research in Germany).13 At other times it uses public relations consultancies and law firms to recruit scientists.2
The desired outcome for the tobacco industry has been to create doubt about the harms of its products, or about the necessity – or efficacy of – tobacco control legislation. It has framed use of its newer products as the only realistic solution to the tobacco epidemic, and aimed to legitimise its role as a stakeholder in science and policymaking.2
These outcomes weaken policy that would reduce industry profits, prevent litigation against the industry, and maximise consumption of its products. In short, the industry’s involvement in science does not primarily advance knowledge or improve the health of populations, but maximises profits.2
For more detailed historical and contemporary examples of how tobacco companies influence science visit Influencing Science Case Studies.
See the list of pages in the category Influencing Science
The Science for Profit Model—How and why corporations influence science and the use of science in policy and practice, T. Legg, J. Hatchard and A.B. Gilmore, Plos One, 2021, 16(6):e0253272, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253272
Document analysis of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World’s scientific outputs and activities: a case study in contemporary tobacco industry agnogenesis, T. Legg, B. Clift, A.B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057667
Paying lip service to publication ethics: scientific publishing practices and the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, T. Legg, M. Legendre, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control 2021;30:e65-e72, doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2020-056003
Seeking to be seen as legitimate members of the scientific community? An analysis of British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International’s involvement in scientific events, B. K. Matthes, A. Fabbri, S. Dance, L. Laurence, K. Silver, A. B. Gilmore, Tobacco Control, 2023, doi: 10.1136/tc-2022-057809
Tobacco industry messaging around harm: Narrative framing in PMI and BAT press releases and annual reports 2011 to 2021, I. Fitzpatrick, S. Dance, K. Silver, M. Violini, T. Hird, Front. Public Health, 2022, 10:958354, doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.958354
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]]>The post Indonesia Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.
]]>According to the authors of a 2023 paper, “Indonesia has a high smoking prevalence that has not diminished significantly since 1990”. This has been driven by male smoking rates which remain amongst the highest in the world.1415 It is the only country in Asia to have neither signed nor ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC),16 and nor is there any comparable national framework for tobacco control.14 Industry interference in policymaking is ongoing, as there is no effective legal mechanism to prevent it.1718 Smoking has long been a part of Indonesian culture, particularly for men, something which tobacco companies have exploited through aggressive marketing tactics that aim to reinforce smoking as a normal or even essential masculine behaviour.1819 This high degree of social acceptability means that the government treats the industry as a legitimate stakeholder.20 One key challenge, therefore, is to de-normalise tobacco use, as part of a comprehensive tobacco control plan.2021
The link between smoking and masculinity is deeply embedded within Indonesian culture.2122 This has been reinforced by tobacco marketing which associates tobacco products with characteristics traditionally considered masculine, such as strength, heroism and self-control.2122
In 2021, tobacco use prevalence amongst adults was 34.5%; 70.2 million adults were current users of tobacco.23 Nearly two-thirds (65.5%) of Indonesian men reported using tobacco, compared to around 3% of women.23
In 2019, nearly 20% of students aged from 13 to 15 reported tobacco use.24 Around 36% of males in this age group reported current tobacco use compared to 3.5% of females.24
Kreteks – cigarettes consisting of tobacco, cloves and flavourings such as chocolate, dried fruit and coffee – are by far the most popular tobacco product in Indonesia. According to government figures from 2017, kreteks accounted for more than 95% of the cigarettes sold that year.25 The cloves provide a unique flavour and smell, and also contain eugenol, a chemical compound which reduces the harshness of the smoke.26 In 2021, close to 30% of all Indonesian adults – around 60 million of the country’s 70 million adult tobacco users – reported smoking kreteks.23
There were an estimated 246,000 deaths attributable to smoking in 2019, accounting for nearly 15% of all mortality in Indonesia that year.27 Research published in 2022 estimated the total cost of smoking to the Indonesian economy in 2019 at between Rp184.36 trillion (US$13 billion) and Rp410.76 trillion (US$29 billion).28 The same study found that direct healthcare costs accounted for between Rp17.9 trillion (US$1.3 billion) and Rp27.7 trillion (US$2 billion), most of which is covered by the Social Security Agency for Health, equivalent to 57-59% of total direct expenditure on healthcare.28
In 2022, market research company Euromonitor International put the value of the Indonesian tobacco market at over US$34 billion.29 It is the second-largest cigarette market in the world.30
The market leader in Indonesia is the local kretek manufacturer PT Gudang Garam Tbk (Gudang Garam), with nearly one-third of the market in 2022.3132
Its closest competitor is Philip Morris International (PMI), with a slightly smaller share.31 PMI operates in Indonesia via its subsidiaries PT Philip Morris Indonesia and PT HM Sampoerna Tbk (Sampoerna).3133 At the time of its acquisition by PMI in 2005, Sampoerna was the leading tobacco company in Indonesia.3334
PT Djarum (Djarum), another local kretek producer, has the third-largest market share, around half that of the two leading companies.3135
Like PMI, other transnational tobacco companies have sought to expand into Indonesia by acquiring local companies. In 2009, British American Tobacco (BAT) bought an 85% stake in PT Bentoel Internasional Investama Tbk (Bentoel) – at the time the fourth largest tobacco company in the country.34 In 2011, the South Korean company Korea Tobacco & Ginseng (KT&G) – which has a partnership with PMI for its newer nicotine and tobacco products – bought a controlling share of Indonesia’s sixth-largest tobacco company, PT Trisakti Purwosari Makmur.3436 Similarly, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) acquired two Gudang Garam subsidiaries, Karyadibya Mahardhika and its distributor, PT Surya Mustika Nusantara, in 2017.34 However, BAT, JTI and KT&G each had market shares of less than 2% as of 2022.31
In 2022, the top four brands of cigarette in Indonesia were all kreteks. Gudang Garam has around one-third of the market. Djarum, A Mild and Dji Sam Soe (the latter two both PMI/Sampoerna brands) each have around a one-tenth share. Others, including PMI’s premium cigarette Marlboro, have smaller shares.37
Tobacco is grown in Indonesia almost entirely on small, family-run farms, and 90% of production comes from just three provinces: East Java, Central Java, and West Nusa Tenggara.38
In 2021, Indonesia reported production of over 237,000 tonnes of raw tobacco, making it the fourth largest producer in the world after China, India and Brazil.39 Production has varied since 2010, from a low of less than 127,000 tonnes in 2016 to a high of nearly 270,000 tonnes in 2019. However, the overall trend in recent decades has been upwards, as shown in the graph below:
Figure 1: Tobacco production, 1980 to 2021.40 Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization/Our World in Data | CC BY
The area harvested under tobacco crop also increased by over 30% between 2000 and 2020, to nearly 220,000 hectares.41
A 2017 report by the World Bank found that poverty was widespread amongst tobacco farmers in Indonesia. Nearly three-quarters of tobacco farmers were poor compared to around one-tenth of the general population.42 Most tobacco-farming households received some form of government social assistance, and more than 60% reported food insecurity.42
Research published in 2020 found that Indonesian tobacco farmers would be better off economically if they grew other crops or pursued alternative, non-agricultural livelihoods.43 Tobacco is also vulnerable to adverse weather conditions in comparison to other crops. In 2016, a period of much higher-than-average rainfall, while non-tobacco farmers made a modest income, tobacco farmers’ income was almost zero.43
Tobacco-farming households had significantly higher labour costs than those growing other crops.44 Tobacco farmers also used child labour, both hired and household, more frequently compared to those growing other crops.43 Similarly, more children from tobacco farms missed school.43 Farmers reported using child labour because tobacco growing does not usually pay enough to hire adult workers.43
An investigation by The Guardian in 2018 visited the village of Beleke, on the island of Lombok, where it found almost all children above the age of four doing tobacco work during harvest season.45 This followed a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2016, which stated that thousands of children work in tobacco farming in Indonesia. HRW found children engaged in dangerous work in four Indonesian provinces, interviewing more than 130. They reported serious health and safety issues, including acute nicotine poisoning as a result of handling tobacco leaves (also known as green tobacco sickness) and contact with pesticides and other chemicals.38
HRW’s interviews with tobacco farmers and traders revealed a lack of human rights due diligence in the tobacco supply chain in Indonesia, particularly regarding child labour.38 The farmers and traders interviewed supplied large Indonesian and transnational companies including Gudang Garam, Sampoerna, Djarum and Bentoel.38
Given its high level of tobacco consumption, Indonesia has long been a net importer of tobacco leaf, despite also being a major producer.44 In 2022, it imported over US$617 million in raw tobacco, compared to around US$266 million in exports.4647
However, it is a net exporter of cigarettes: over US$913 million in 2022, compared to US$118 million in imports.4849
In 2020 the WHO reported that the contribution of the tobacco industry to the Indonesian economy was relatively small; tobacco manufacturing generates just 0.6% of total employment, while tobacco farmers represent only 1.6% of the agricultural workforce. Most families involved in tobacco growing and kretek rolling also receive some form of social assistance – meaning that the Indonesian state is essentially subsidising poorly-paid employment in the tobacco industry.50
A study published in 2019, which collected packs of cigarettes from respondents in Indonesia, found that 20% of the 1,440 smokers surveyed reported ever smoking illicit cigarettes. However, among the 1,201 packs researchers collected, only 20 (i.e. 1.6%) had no excise stamp, a fake excise stamp, or no graphic health warning – and hence were potentially illicit. Price appears to be a factor, with people on lower incomes more likely to purchase illicit cigarettes, though consumption of illicit cigarettes was not found to be a long-term behaviour.51 However, a 2021 study estimated that the share of illicit cigarette consumption in the country increased from 5% in 2013 to 19% in 2018.52
Globally, Free Trade Zones (FTZs) are well known to facilitate the illicit tobacco trade.53 There are four FTZs in Indonesia, where cigarette production and trade are exempted from excise duties, making the price much lower. Cigarettes leak from these FTZs, becoming illicit in the process, as the packs bear no excise stamps.54 In August 2023, Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission announced that a senior official from the Bintan Free Trade and Port Zone had been arrested on charges of data manipulation and receiving bribes from cigarette companies, to allow greater flows of duty-free cigarettes through the zone.55
Internal industry documents suggest that historically, BAT has been involved in illicit trade in Indonesia and the broader region.56 A 1994 internal BAT document points to Indonesia – along with Malaysia – as a conduit of illicit products to the Philippines.57 A BAT-commissioned study from the 1980s also documented Indonesian consumers’ preference for its smuggled products.58
As part of the third round of the Philip Morris International initiative PMI IMPACT, PMI is funding the Institute for Development of Economics and Finance, an Indonesian think tank, to “examine the market for NTHRPs [nicotine and tobacco harm reduction products] and how to prevent illicit trade in this growing sector, with research to include surveys and limited group discussions”.59
Indonesia is the world’s second-biggest contributor to marine plastic pollution after China, responsible for 1.29 million tonnes of debris entering the ocean annually.60 Of this waste, cigarette butts are the most commonly-littered item.61 The Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control has estimated the cost of tobacco-related marine pollution and waste management in Indonesia at Rp49 trillion (US$3.1 billion) per year.62
Indonesia is not a party to the WHO FCTC, and is therefore ineligible to join the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. As of 2023, there appears to be little political will either to ratify the WHO FCTC or to create a comparable national framework for tobacco control. This has led to a fragmented approach across different government departments and prevented the development of coherent tobacco control policies.14
However, Indonesia has committed to an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) five-year plan on health, under which it has pledged to reaffirm collective positions against industry interference and for implementation of control measures, for both tobacco and alcohol.63
In 2009, the passage of Law No. 36 authorised the Ministry of Health to introduce tobacco control regulation, including on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship (TAPS); smoke-free spaces; and packaging and labelling of tobacco products.64 This was followed in 2012 by Indonesia’s principal tobacco control law, Government Regulation 109 (PP 109/2012).64 These laws prohibit smoking on public transport, and in educational facilities and places of worship, though other types of enclosed public spaces, including workplaces, restaurants and government facilities, may provide smoking areas.6566 More stringent regulations at the subnational level are permitted.65 As of June 2023, 456 (around 86%) of Indonesia’s 520 cities and districts had adopted smoke-free policies, though implementation remains a challenge.67
Indonesia is one of the few countries that still permits tobacco advertising on television, though it may not be broadcast until after 9:30pm.6564 While Law No. 36 and PP 109/2012 also introduced graphic health warnings (GHWs) on tobacco packaging and banned misleading terms such as “light” and “low-tar”, the law was not retroactive for tobacco products that already had these words in their branding, and other misleading features – such as colours, numbers and symbols – are still permitted.6564
As of 2024, various other limitations remain. There are no restrictions on internet sales or the sale of individual cigarettes (single sticks); there is no national law regulating the sale, use, advertising, promotion, sponsorship, packaging or labelling of e-cigarettes; and tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) is still permitted.6466 Cigarettes in Indonesia also remain relatively cheap. In 2022, the price of the bestselling brand of cigarettes was just over US$2.66
In 2018, President Widodo issued a decree containing a list of government regulations to be revised, which included PP 109/2012.68 Tobacco control advocates have seen this as an opportunity to push for stronger regulations, such as larger GHWs, higher excise taxes on cigarettes and a comprehensive ban on TAPS.68 However, this process has stalled, amidst conflict between different government ministries and opposition from farmers’ associations and other groups (see section “Use of third parties”).68 As of March 2024, the revision of PP 109/2012 had yet to advance.
For more details, please see the following websites:
Tobacco industry tactics in Indonesia include the use of third parties; the targeting of youth with tobacco marketing, both at point of sale and online, as well as via event sponsorship; and sponsorship of popular sports such as badminton and football.
The tobacco industry has long used third parties and front groups to advance its interests, as a means of achieving greater credibility and overcoming public mistrust.
The Indonesian Tobacco Farmers’ Association (Asosiasi Petani Tembakau Indonesia, APTI), a lobby group, opposes the WHO FCTC, and has urged the Indonesian government not to ratify the treaty.69 It has also frequently lobbied against increases in excise taxes on tobacco products. In 2019, APTI held a rally in front of the Ministry of Finance, to demand the repeal of an increase in excise and the retail price of cigarettes, and the revision of a regulation requiring at least 50% of the Tobacco Excise Revenue Sharing Fund to be allocated to health purposes.70
APTI has also opposed the proposed revision to Indonesia’s main tobacco control law, PP 109/2012. In 2022, in Temanggung, a major tobacco-growing region in Central Java, APTI representatives were seen at a public event displaying banners asking the local government for support in opposing the proposal.71 APTI also sent official letters to President Widodo opposing the revision, stating that it would negatively affect the livelihoods of people working in the tobacco sector, particularly farmers.68
Another lobby group which has opposed of any revision of PP 109/2012 is the Indonesian Tobacco Community Alliance (Aliansi Masyarakat Tembakau Indonesia, AMTI), a coalition of tobacco industry stakeholders – including cigarette manufacturers – established in 2010.72 It reportedly has close links to the PMI subsidiary Sampoerna.7374 AMTI has sought to portray tobacco control as an agenda imposed on Indonesia by foreign actors who do not understand the local context – a common tobacco industry tactic in the country.7576
Both APTI and AMTI are affiliates of the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA), a global front group funded and run by the ‘Big Four’ transnational tobacco companies (TTCs), as well as two major leaf merchants.777879 Though ITGA claims to defend the interests of tobacco farmers and their communities around the world, it uses tobacco farmers as a means of opposing tobacco control regulations and protecting the interests of the TTCs.79
The tobacco industry has long seen young people as a vital target market; tobacco use generally starts in adolescence. In Indonesia, the mean age of smoking initiation amongst males is 18.3 years, while smoking prevalence amongst Indonesian adolescents (aged 10 to 18) increased from 7% in 2013 to 9% in 2018.8081
In Indonesia, there is a high concentration of tobacco retailers, high exposure to point-of-sale advertising and no restriction on the display of cigarette packs in retail outlets – all of which are associated with increased tobacco use amongst adolescents.668182 In addition, many retailers are located close to schools; enforcement of the ban on sales to minors is very weak; while sales of single sticks, which make smoking more accessible to young people, are still permitted.828183 Retailers therefore have an important role in recruiting new, young smokers, and maintaining growth of the market.81
Indonesia’s incomplete TAPS regulations have also allowed the tobacco industry to switch to less regulated forms of advertising such as event sponsorship and internet marketing, often targeting young people.84
For example, the popular music festival SoundrenAline, which has been running in Indonesia since 2002, was founded by Sampoerna.85 Following a visit to SoundrenAline 2016, researchers reported that Sampoerna branding and the slogan “Go Ahead” were found throughout the festival site. Sampoerna A brand cigarettes were widely sold, including by cigarette girls and boys – a form of direct one-on-one marketing.8486 Cigarettes that were not a Sampoerna brand were confiscated at the entrance.84 As of 2022, Sampoerna was still the sponsor of the event and owner of the registered trademark for “SoundrenAline”.85
With over 111 million users, Indonesia has one of the world’s largest Instagram audiences, over half of whom are aged between 13 and 24.87 According to the Tobacco Enforcement and Reporting Movement (TERM), as of 2023, around 70% of online tobacco marketing in Indonesia took place on Instagram.8889 Most of this marketing is indirect and community based. Rather than display their products directly, the tobacco companies build online communities of followers with a common interest such as music, travel or sport, as a means of improving brand visibility and indirectly promoting their products.8988
Tobacco industry sponsorship of sport is as old as professional athletic competition itself.90 It aims to create links between pre-existing associations people may have with sports (such as fun, excitement, strength, etc.) with tobacco branding and products; promote an image of tobacco use as normal and healthy; and appeal to young people.91
In Indonesia, TAPS has historically been very widespread in popular sports.92 Badminton, for instance, which the New York Times has described as part of Indonesia’s “national identity”, has long been a vehicle for tobacco industry sponsorship.93 From 2006, Djarum was the corporate sponsor of the national badminton trials for children and adolescents aged from 5 to 18.94 The trials were shown on national television, and participants were required to wear clothing which displayed the Djarum logo.8194
Ten civil society organisations reported Djarum to the National Commission on Child Protection, arguing that the sponsorship violated Indonesia’s child protection law.94 In 2019, Djarum agreed to remove its logos from the badminton trials.9596 It also withdrew its sponsorship from future trials, which critics argued would undermine development of young talent. However, in 2021 the state-owned telecommunications firm Telkom replaced Djarum as sponsor.94
Djarum owns the PB Djarum badminton club in Kudus, Central Java, which has a youth academy, as well as a club in Jakarta.938897 The company also continues to market itself and its products indirectly via Djarum-associated social media accounts which focus on badminton-related content.8988
An investigation into tobacco marketing on social media in Indonesia, India and Mexico around the 2022 FIFA World Cup found that 92% of the football-themed tobacco marketing originated from Indonesia, with 81% being produced by Djarum alone.92
Both Gudang Garam and Djarum, via their respective brands Intersoccer and Super Soccer, sponsored live World Cup viewing parties. Super Soccer, which describes itself as the “home of soccer fans in Indonesia”, promotes its activities on social media to hundreds of thousands of followers.92 It developed a “Soccerphoria” event series and campaign specifically for the World Cup, which were heavily promoted across its accounts. As well as the live viewing parties, these events involved mural painting, branded clothes, and limited-edition World Cup cigarette packs designed by local artists.92
In 2019, Djarum bought the Italian Serie B club Como 1907, via its subsidiaries SENT Entertainment Ltd and Mola TV. Mola, a television streaming service, has broadcast a reality TV series following 24 young footballers trying to succeed at Como 1907.
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]]>The post Philippines Country Profile appeared first on TobaccoTactics.
]]>The Philippines has made some progress on tobacco control, especially since the introduction of the reforms known as the Sin Taxes in 2013. These both greatly simplified tax structures and significantly increased excise on tobacco and alcohol products, with a substantial share of the new revenue being channelled into universal healthcare.98 Tobacco use prevalence, which stood at 29.7% in 2009, had fallen to 23.8% by 2015, and again to 19.5% by 2021.9923 However, rising incomes and subsequent smaller increases in tobacco taxes have made cigarettes more affordable, slowing further progress.100 Other challenges include an illicit tobacco market larger than the global average;101 the growing popularity of newer nicotine and tobacco products (particularly e-cigarettes) amongst young people;102 and ongoing tobacco industry presence on the inter-agency committee responsible for implementing tobacco control regulation in the country.103 Philippine domestic law continues to fall short of what is required by the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) across a number of areas.66
In 2022, the population of the Philippines was 115.6 million.104 According to the 2021 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), tobacco use prevalence amongst Filipino adults was 19.5%.23 Prevalence is much higher amongst males (nearly 35%) than females (just over 4%).23 Amongst adolescents aged between 13 and 15, 12.5% were using some form of tobacco in 2019.24 Again, prevalence for males (over 18%) is higher than for females (nearly 7%).24
In the 2021 GATS, just over 2% of Filipino adults reported current use of e-cigarettes (3.6% males; 0.5% females).23 However, use of e-cigarettes is considerably higher amongst youth. In the 2019 Global Youth Tobacco Survey, the corresponding figure was over 14% – higher than for conventional cigarettes (10%).24 More than 20% of boys aged between 13 and 15 reported using e-cigarettes, compared to 7.5% of girls.24 Smokeless tobacco use in the Philippines also appears to be greater amongst the young: in 2019, 3% of young people reported current smokeless tobacco use, compared to 1.5% of adults in 2021.2423
There were an estimated 95,600 deaths attributable to tobacco use in 2019, accounting for nearly 15% of all mortality in the Philippines that year.105 According to a 2018 study, the economic burden of tobacco use in the Philippines in 2012 was just under PHP₱270 billion (US$15.1 billion according to the purchasing power parity exchange rate) – equivalent to 2.5% of national GDP. This includes both direct costs resulting from tobacco use (e.g., hospitalisations and medication) as well as indirect costs (reduced productivity due to disability and mortality). The same study found that diseases attributable to tobacco use accounted for nearly 5% of total health expenditure.106
PMFTC Inc. (PMFTC) dominates the Philippine cigarette market, with a market share of around 61% in 2022.31 PMFTC is a joint venture between Philip Morris International (PMI) and the Fortune Tobacco Corporation, the tobacco business of local conglomerate LT Group.107
Japan Tobacco International (JTI) has a market share of 38%, thanks to its 2017 acquisition of local company Mighty Corporation.31108 Together, PMFTC and JTI account for virtually all of the licit cigarette sales in the country.31
PMI’s flagship brand Marlboro is the most popular brand of cigarette, with a share of nearly 33% in 2022. In second place is another PMFTC brand, Fortune International, with a share of nearly 17%. JTI’s Winston is third, with a market share of around 14%. All other brands have market shares of less than 10%.109
At nearly 23%, the Philippines has one of the largest market shares for menthol cigarettes in the world.110111 Menthol cigarettes have been marketed in the Philippines since at least the 1970s, including in campaigns targeting young women.112 In more recent times, the menthol market share has increased year on year since 2014. Similarly, though the market for flavour capsule cigarettes is much smaller than for menthol, it has also been growing steadily, with yearly increases since 2015.110 These products are often more attractive to youth and young adults than conventional cigarettes; menthol in particular is associated with increased smoking initiation.111
Since the early 1960s, tobacco production in the Philippines has remained roughly stable, at between 40,000 and 70,000 tonnes a year. However, between 1981 and 1993 it increased to between 74,000 and 118,000 tonnes. Conversely, between 2006 and 2009 it dipped below 40,000, to a low of 32,000 tonnes in 2008.113
Figure 1: Tobacco production, 1961 to 2021.113 Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization/Our World in Data | CC BY
Research has demonstrated that tobacco growing is not a profitable enterprise for most farmers. Despite this, farmers continue to grow tobacco due to a belief in its profitability and the reliability of the tobacco market; its perceived resilience to bad weather compared to other crops; and, in particular, access to credit.114 Filipino farmers interviewed for a study published in 2019 stated that tobacco farming allowed them to take out loans to which they would not have had access had they been growing other crops. Loans were also used to cover non-agricultural expenses such as school fees, buying food, and paying off other loans.114
As part of the Sin Tax reforms, 15% of the revenue collected from tobacco taxes is allocated to tobacco-growing communities to promote economically viable alternatives.115 However, this remains a challenge. Farmers have cited lack of capital, difficulties accessing credit, an absence of technical support and a perceived lack of markets for other crops as reasons for not transitioning away from tobacco.114
Tobacco is also one of 13 commodities produced in the Philippines which feature on the U.S. Department of Labor’s 2022 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.116 However, comprehensive and up-to-date information on child labour in Philippine tobacco farming is not available.
The Philippines is a net importer of raw tobacco, importing about US$243 million of raw tobacco in 2022, compared to exports of around US$184 million.117118 However, the country is a net exporter of cigarettes, with exports in the same year of over US$232 million, compared to about US$22.6 million in imports.119120
Illicit tobacco was estimated to form around 16% of the market in the Philippines in 2018.101 Though this is above the likely global average of 11 to 12%, it has changed little since 1998.101121 Though industry-funded studies found significant increases in the Philippine illicit tobacco trade following the introduction of the Sin Taxes in 2013, there is no independent evidence to support this.101
The WHO reports that curing in tobacco agriculture is a leading cause of demand for wood from native forests in the Philippines.122
Farmers cultivating the native batek variety of tobacco in the southern Philippines have been documented as using several toxic agrochemicals to control pests. These include some listed as hazardous by the WHO, such as cypermethrin and methomyl.123
It has been estimated that between 30 and 50 billion cigarette butts are littered every year in the Philippines – 12.5 million on the resort island of Boracay alone.124 Boracay was closed for six months in 2018 for environmental rehabilitation, resulting in billions in lost revenues for both government and the private sector.124125
The Philippines ratified the WHO FCTC in 2005 and the treaty entered into force later that year.126127 WHO FCTC ratification was a catalyst for strengthening tobacco control laws in the country and reducing industry influence on policy.127 However, the Philippines is not a party to the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.128
The Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003 (RA 9211) is the country’s main tobacco control law, covering areas such as smoking in public places; tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and sales restrictions. Subsequent legislation built on the 2003 law, introducing further regulation on issues such as designated smoking areas, advertising and the packaging and labelling of tobacco products.129
However, given that RA 9211 was enacted just three months before the Philippines signed the WHO FCTC, Filipino tobacco control advocates have argued that the law was both timed and designed to pre-empt the Convention. This has resulted in tobacco control regulations which, nearly 20 years later, still fall some way short of WHO FCTC requirements.103130 Designated smoking areas are still permitted in indoor offices and workplaces; restaurants; and cafés, pubs and bars. Restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship remain incomplete. And at 50.6% of the retail value of the most popular brand of cigarettes, tobacco taxation is significantly below the 75% threshold recommended by the WHO.66
The tobacco industry, led by the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), has also used RA 9211 as justification for delaying the introduction of more WHO FCTC-compliant measures (such as graphic health warnings), arguing that such measures contravene existing Philippine law.130131
In August 2020, the joint House Committees on Trade and Industry and on Health approved a bill regulating manufacture, sale and use of e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products (HTPs).132 This bill reversed an earlier decision to raise the purchase age from 18 to 21 and restrict flavourings to tobacco and plain menthol. It also shifted responsibility for regulation of these products from the Food and Drug Administration to the Department of Trade and Industry. Eight days after the bill was approved, the first of four stores dedicated to PMI’s flagship HTP IQOS opened for business.133
This bill was a precursor to the Vaporized Nicotine and Non-Nicotine Products Regulation Act, which eventually became law in July 2022. E-cigarettes in hundreds of different flavours reportedly flooded the Philippine market in the months following the passage of the law.134 Leading Filipino tobacco control advocates argue that the law has undermined recent gains in tobacco control.133
For more details, please see the following websites:
Recent tobacco industry tactics in the Philippines include attempting to influence the committee responsible for overseeing tobacco control in the country; corporate social responsibility, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic; and attempts to influence policy, including by establishing relationships at the very top of government.
The Philippines’ main tobacco control law, RA 9211, requires the government to implement a “balanced policy”, given that:
“It is the policy of the State to protect the populace from hazardous products and promote the right to health and instill health consciousness among them. It is also the policy of the State, consistent with the Constitutional ideal to promote the general welfare, to safeguard the interests of the workers and other stakeholders in the tobacco industry.”135
However, the first principle of the implementation guidelines for Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC states that “There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests.”136 Any requirement for “balance” can only therefore hinder progress on tobacco control and undermine public health.
This may be seen in the composition of the Interagency Committee on Tobacco (IAC-T), a multisectoral body established by RA 9211 responsible for overseeing implementation of the legislation.135 One seat on the IAC-T is reserved for the National Tobacco Administration (NTA) – a government agency that sits within the Department of Agriculture – which has a mandate to “Promote the balanced and integrated growth and development of the tobacco industry to help make agriculture a solid base for industrialization.”137
Another seat is reserved for a representative of the tobacco industry, specifically the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI), an association whose members over the years have included PMFTC and JTI, among others.135138139140 The PTI has a long history of undermining tobacco control measures, including successfully managing to reduce the size of graphic health warnings on tobacco products, opposing tobacco tax reforms and litigating over tobacco control regulations against public bodies such as the City of Balanga and the Department of Health.139141142
Tobacco control advocates have called repeatedly for the removal of the PTI from the IAC-T, citing conflict of interest and alleging that it uses its position to actively weaken tobacco control policies.139143144 The WHO has supported this position, stating that the composition of the Philippine IAC-T “is blatantly in conflict with WHO FCTC Article 5.3”, which requires parties to protect their public health policies against the commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry.145
As of 2023, there was still no ban on tobacco industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the Philippines.66 The tobacco industry has taken advantage of this shortcoming to try to enhance its reputation and influence both policy makers and the general public.
From 2017 to 2021, PMI spent nearly US$38 million on CSR in the Philippines. Nearly US$31 million of this total was spent in 2020 and 2021 alone.146 Much of this funding is channelled through the Jaime V. Ongpin Foundation (JVOFI), a development NGO and partner of “Embrace”, PMFTC’s CSR programme.146147 During 2020, in the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic, JVOFI distributed ambulances, ventilators, PCR machines for COVID-19 testing, personal protective equipment, food supplies and rapid test kits throughout the country.147
PMI was far from the only tobacco industry player carrying out this kind of work: by mid-April 2020, the LT Group – PMI’s partner in joint venture PMFTC – had spent PHP₱200 million (around US$4 million) on COVID-19 assistance.147 The LT Group implements such initiatives in the Philippines via its CSR arm, the Tan Yan Kee Foundation.148 Also in April 2020, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) donated 20,000 face masks to hospitals in the province of Batangas, where its manufacturing facilities are located.147
An investigation published by the media and business intelligence organisation Eco-Business in 2021 revealed that a number of congressional representatives were involved in the distribution of COVID-19 relief donated by the tobacco industry and its associates.133 These donations also coincided with several debates in Congress which addressed regulation for newer nicotine and tobacco products (see section “Roadmap to Tobacco Control”).133130
Both PMI and JTI also lobbied the Philippine Ministry of Finance for permission to continue their operations as normal during lockdown, though cigarettes were not considered to be an essential item.147 In an April 2020 press release, JTI argued that lockdown restrictions were forcing smokers to buy illicit tobacco; were resulting in lower tax revenues for government; and were harming retailers, especially small and family-run businesses.149 Restrictions on the transport and delivery of tobacco products were subsequently lifted.150
This shows how industry arguments around the illicit trade were accepted by Filipino policy makers, allowing tobacco companies to operate even during an outbreak of a lethal respiratory disease to which smokers are more vulnerable.151
Hailing from the Ilocos region, where tobacco is a major cash crop, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has met with PMI at least twice since becoming president in June 2022.134152 The most recent of these meetings was a lunch he and First Lady Liza Araneta-Marcos hosted for PMI executives – including CEO Jacek Olczak – at the Malacañang Palace in November 2022, the first time a company CEO has been received at the Philippine presidential palace. Also present were PMFTC president Denis Gorkun and LT Group CEO Lucio Tan III.134
PMFTC’s director for global communications stated that the aim of the meeting was to outline the company’s plan “to expand our economic footprint in the Philippines.”134 PMI is reportedly investing US$150 million in the expansion of a manufacturing plant in Tanauan, Batangas. The new wing of the factory is to be used for the production of BLENDS, tobacco sticks used exclusively in PMI’s BONDS, a more affordable version of its flagship HTP IQOS.134
In 2012, the then Senator Marcos was photographed during a Senate debate on the Sin Taxes speaking to a lawyer representing PMFTC.153154
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]]>PM’s secret method of recruiting so-called independent scientists for the project is laid out in various documents. One is BAT scientist Dr Sharon Boyce, who attended a “special meeting” on London in 1988:157
The Philip Morris philosophy of ETS was presented. This appeared to revolve around the selection, in all possible countries, of a group of scientists either to critically review the scientific literature on ETS to sustain controversy, or to carry out research on ETS. In each country a group of scientists would be carefully selected, and organised, by a national coordinating scientist.157
The scientists:
“should, ideally, according to Philip Morris, be European scientists who have had no previous connections with tobacco companies and who have no previous record on the primary health issue which might … lead to problems of attribution. The mechanism by which they identify their consultants is as follows: they ask a couple of scientists in each country … to produce a list of potential consultants. The scientists are then contacted by these coordinators or by the lawyers and asked if they are interested in problems of Indoor Air Quality: tobacco is not mentioned at this stage. CV’s are obtained and obvious “anti-smokers” or those with “unsuitable backgrounds” are filtered out…”157
Philip Morris then expect the group of scientists to operate within the confines of decisions taken by PM scientists to determine the general direction of research, which apparently would then be ‘filtered’ by lawyers to eliminate areas of sensitivity.157
Boyse’s notes include a list of 18 scientists, mostly at British universities, who were suggested as possible consultants.157
By 1990, Covington and Burling boasted of its successes of the Whitecoat project.158 “One consultant is an adviser to a particularly relevant committee of the House of Commons”.158 Another was recruited as an editor of the Lancet.158 A third was “providing medical advice to Middle eastern Governments”.158 One other consultant conducted “research into factors other than passive smoking that cause lung cancer – keeping pet birds”.158159
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]]>The three corporations brought to trial were: Imperial Tobacco Canada,162 Rothmans Benson & Hedges, owned by Philip Morris International (PMI), and Japan Tobacco International subsidiary JTI McDonald. The class action suit was brought by people who contracted cancer or emphysema as a result of smoking, or were addicted to smoking. The case revolved around whether the tobacco companies met their duty to inform customers about the dangers of smoking.
Michel Descôteaux was the first witness in the trial. He began working for Imperial Tobacco in 1963 and for 20 years was its only spokesperson.161In 1976, Descôteaux was public relations director for one of Canada’s biggest tobacco companies – Imperial Tobacco Canada. The company asked the 29-year-old to come up with some ideas to help the industry, which was increasingly under fire about the damage its products caused and Descôteaux wrote a memo to Imperial’s vice-president at the time, Tony Kalhok, responding to these concerns:160
“People who smoke themselves to a premature death may be good customers in the short run but they certainly contribute to the scary statistics and provide wonderful ammunition for tobacco adversaries.”160
Until he retired in 2002, Descôteaux was “one of the architects of its policy to discredit the overwhelming scientific evidence that smoking is addictive and causes cancer and other diseases.”160
In the 1980s, Alcan Aluminum Ltd. supplied Imperial with its aluminium packaging. When Alcan became one of the first companies to institute a workplace ban on smoking in 1980, Imperial Tobacco launched a campaign to convince the manufacturer to reverse its ban.160
Imperial Tobacco president and chairman Paul Paré wrote to the president of Alcan “expressing his disapproval of the ban, complaining he had not been informed about it and suggesting it might have a negative impact on relations between the two companies. “I merely register my disappointment at seeing it in place and my difficulty of reconciling it with our long-standing corporate relationships””.160
Imperial then “marshalled the forces of its public affairs department to convince Alcan to retreat from its ban.” Department director Michel Descôteaux met with a senior Alcan official and warned him that “depriving workers of the right to smoke on the job could lead to increased stress in the workplace and a rise in the number of workplace accidents.” Descôteaux also sent Alcan officials research papers written by tobacco industry scientists which denied that there was proof of a link between cancer and smoking.
In the 1976 memo, quoted above, Descôteaux said that the “position I suggest [Imperial Tobacco Canada] adopt is that we are innocent until proven guilty.”160
In response to the increasing number of studies indicating that cigarettes were dangerous to people’s health, Descoteax said that Imperial should denounce these with vigor and try to discredit them as much as possible” and should develop products “that would provide the same satisfaction as today’s cigarettes without ‘enslaving’ consumers.”160
In another memo Descôteaux wrote that more women were smoking because of the women’s liberation movement:
“Perhaps it will be more difficult to convince women that they should stop smoking, enough to make every one of us some of the most ardent feminists!”160
Descôteaux went on to recommend that the company not follow advice from British American Tobacco (Imperial’s major stockholder) which said that employees should follow doctors’ advice not to smoke while pregnant. He wrote that employees should be told :
“in the absence of definitive answers to this question, many doctors advice (sic) their pregnant patients to modify their smoking habits during pregnancy as a sensible part of prenatal behaviour.”
He also said that advising employees to follow the advice of doctors “could open the door to claims for warnings on cigarette packages.”161
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